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REASONS WHY WE SHOULD AMEND THE CONSTITUTION TO
PROTECT PRIVACY
DEBORAH PIERCE*
INTRODUCTION
Those of us in the privacy community are frustrated at seeing privacy
rights being not just whittled away but, in many cases, dismissed whole-
sale. Over the last few years, we have been focusing our efforts on the use
and resale of personal information that has been used by data aggregators,'
particularly ChoicePoint2 and Acxiom. 3 Specifically, we have been looking
at the questionable accuracy of this data and how it has been proposed to be
used as part of the Transportation Security Administration's 4 airline pas-
* Deborah Pierce is the Executive Director of PrivacyActivism, a non-profit organization she
co-founded in 2001. Her work focuses on consumer education campaigns, advocacy, and analysis of
privacy issues, with particular emphasis on privacy and social networks.
In 2005, Deborah chaired the Association for Computing Machinery's Computers, Freedom,
and Privacy (CFP) conference, bringing together attendees not only from government, business, educa-
tion, and non-profits, but also from the community of computer professionals, hackers, crackers, and
engineers who work the code of cyberspace.
In summer 2010, PrivacyActivism will release a graphic novel online and in print, aimed at
high school students, detailing the adventures of Carabella as she negotiates the trials of college life,
social networks, privacy, and space aliens.
1. For a discussion of data aggregators, see, for example, Grayson Barber, Personal Information
in Government Records: Protecting the Public Interest in Privacy, 25 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 63
(2006); James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1459 (2004); Elizabeth D. De Armond, Frothy Chaos: Modern Data Warehousing and Old-
Fashioned Defamation, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 1061 (2007).
2. See, e.g., Choicepoint Says It's Sorry, WIRED, Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.wired.com/politics/
security/news/2005/03/66912; Kim Zetter, California Woman Sues ChoicePoint, WIRED, Feb. 24, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0, 1848,667 10,00.html?tw-wn._tophead_3; Kim Zetter, ID Theft
Victims Could Lose Twice, WIRED, Feb. 23, 2005, http://www.wired.com/ news/privacy/0,66685-
I.html?tw-wnstorypagenextl. For a discussion of the Bank of America incident, see, for example,
Paul Newell, Bank of America Says Tapes with Customer Data Lost, TECH. REV., Feb. 28, 2005,
http://wwwnl.technologyreview.com/t?ctl=BE60DD:2EDABCF.
3. See, e.g., Database Company Hacked Again: Florida Man Arrested for Huge Theft of Person-
al Data, MSNBC, July 21, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5481403/; John Leyden, Spammer
Charged in Huge Acxiom Personal Data Theft, THE REGISTER, July 22, 2004, available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/07/22/acxiom__hack_charges/; Jay Lyman, Acxiom Database Hack
Highlights Risk, TECHNEWSWORLD, Aug. 11, 2003, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/ 31306.html;
Laura Rohde, Florida Hacker Indicted in Big Online Theft Case, COMPUTERWORLD, July 22, 2004,
http://computerworld.corn/securitytopics/security/story/0, 10801,94673,00.html.
4. Transportation Security Administration, Overview of the Transportation Security Administra-
tion's "Secure Flight" Program, http://www.tsa.gov/what-we-do/layers/secureflight/index.shtm#
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
senger profiling system, "Secure Flight."' 5 These examples illustrate the
problem of using people's personal information and how we are rapidly
moving into a panoptic society. 6 This movement is troubling and requires
national debate.
I have noticed that people think that they have more privacy rights
than they actually do. Similarly, when people understand issues and know
what it is they can do to protect their privacy, they actually will go out and
do it. As an experiment, I have been going back to grass roots efforts
through social networking websites. I have been spending some time on
social networks, such as Tribe, 7 LiveJournal, 8 and Facebook,9 to try to
reach new people interested in learning about privacy and teach them the
basics of protecting consumer privacy. Through these outreach expe-
riences, I have come to the conclusion that the best way to address privacy
is to add it expressly to the Constitution via a Constitutional amendment.
I. MOVING TOWARD THE PANOPTICON
There are many trends that are moving us in the direction of panoptic
society, where continuous surveillance is a fact of life. This panoptic socie-
ty involves tracking Internet usage, searches, and use of the transportation
system. The result is that everything that used to be private is not anymore.
howitworks (last visited Dec. 12, 2009).
5. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON
COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, U.S. SENATE: AVIATION SECURITY, SIGNIFICANT
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES MAY ADVERSELY AFFECT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM, STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK
(2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06374t.pdf; SECURE FLIGHT WORKING GRP.,
REPORT OF THE SECURE FLIGHT WORKING GROUP (2005); Electronic Privacy Information Center,
Secure Flight, http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/secureflight.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2009); see
also, e.g., Stephen W. Dummer, False Positives and Secure Flight Using Dataveillance When Viewed
through the Ever Increasing Likelihood of Identity Theft, 11 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 259 (2006); loannis
Ntouvas, Air Passenger Data Transfer to the USA: The Decision of the ECI and Latest Developments,
16 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 73 (2008); Timothy M. Ravich, Is Airline Passenger Profiling Necessary?,
62 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (2007).
6. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 45 (Miran Bozovic ed., Verso 1995) (1787).
See also, e.g., George J. Alexander, Is ITS It? Some Conclusions About the Panopticon, 11 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 137 (1995); Ian Leader-Elliott, Benthamite Reflections on Codi-
fication of the General Principles of Criminal Liability: Towards the Panopticon, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 391 (2006); Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the
Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 27 (1995); Steven B. Toeniskoetter, Preventing a Modern Panopticon: Law Enforce-
ment Acquisition of Real-Time Cellular Tracking Data, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 16 (2007); James Theo-
dore Gentry, The Panopticon Revisited: The Problem of Monitoring Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 353
(1986).
7. Tribe, http://www.tribe.net (last visited Dec. 2, 2009).
8. LiveJournal, http://livejoumal.com (last visited Dec. 2, 2009).
9. Facebook, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Dec. 2, 2009).
[Vol 84:3
REASONS WHY WE SHOULD AMEND THE CONSTITUTION
A. Data Aggregators
My first focus is data aggregators, such as ChoicePoint and Acxiom,
and their intersection with Secure Flight. These companies gather a signifi-
cant amount of information about you, including credit information, places
where you have lived, cars that you have owned, your relatives, places
where your neighbors lived, your neighbors' personal information, etc.
When I looked at my ChoicePoint file, it had all of my neighbors, their
phone numbers and, in some cases, their social security numbers. In other
words, each data aggregator file constitutes a large amount of information
in one place, and this information is sold off to other companies for such
purposes as background checks. Also, these files are sold back to the gov-
ernment, very neatly avoiding the requirement of a search warrant. 10
B. Deletion and Correction of Erroneous Information
Deletion of erroneous information is difficult, if not impossible. Par-
ticularly in the case of bad information due to identity theft, this lack of
accuracy is problematic. The massive data breach at ChoicePoint a few
years ago'1 that resulted in several hundred thousand people's personal
information being violated received attention, 12 particularly due to the in-
creased risk of identity theft. 13
The other fundamental issue relates to the accuracy of the data held by
data aggregators. I will use my own ChoicePoint file as an example. I
pulled my own file and received a twenty-page document that was filled
with errors. Some of the more significant errors that were in my file in-
cluded one stating that a manual check of the Texas Criminal records file
would be recommended to see if I had a potential criminal record because
10. The Department of Homeland Security is one of Acxiom's customers. See, e.g., Jill D.
Rhodes, CAPPS H: Red Light, Green Light, or "Mother, May I?," J. HOMELAND SECURITY, Mar. 9,
2004, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/displayarticle.asp?article=107; Arshad Mo-
hammed & Sara Kehaulani Goo, Government Increasingly Turning to Data Mining: Peek Into Private
Lives May Help in Hunt for Terrorists, WASH. POST, June 15, 2006, at D3.
11. See sources cited supra note 2.
12. Id.
13. No specific avenues of legal recourse are available to harmed individuals to create incentives
for speakers to implement better security practices in the future. Suits have been failing due in part to
difficulty in establishing legally adequate causality and damages in connection with a particular data
breach leading to a particular incidence of identity theft. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, ID Theft Victims Could
Lose Twice, WIRED, Feb. 25, 2005, http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/ 2005/02/66685. An
FTC prosecution or state attorney general prosecution may occur; however, the frequency of such
prosecutions is low due to limited agency resources. For a list of recent FTC prosecutions for weak
information security practices, see, for example, Federal Trade Commission, Commission Actions for
January 2008, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/01/index.shtm (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
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my name matched some criteria. I have only been to Texas twice, once for
a computer privacy conference and once by invitation of the Texas Attor-
ney General for a roundtable discussion regarding online privacy. I really
did not have much time to get in trouble there, even if I were interested in
doing so. Yet, there it is in my ChoicePoint file-the implication of a crim-
inal record in Texas.
The question that I would pose to employers would be what conse-
quences arise from coming across this type of a false connection in my
background check. How does a background check that has that little quota-
tion in it compare to somebody else's background check that does not have
it? Which person would you hire? I think it is much easier to hire the per-
son without that (alleged) blemish on her record.
There were other notable errors in my ChoicePoint file. It listed pages
of potential relatives and, as it turns out, none of these people are related to
me. They were included anyway, however, as were all of their addresses,
phone numbers, and social security numbers. A list of all of my parents'
neighbors and their phone numbers was also included. The report contained
a list of cars that they thought I had owned, though I actually had owned
none of them. It had places where ChoicePoint thought that I had lived.
One was an old address of my spouse's where I have never lived. It was
very interesting that in this twenty-page document, roughly eighty percent
of the information was incorrect in some form.
C. Data Errors Are Ubiquitous
The disproportionate amount of bad data in my ChoicePoint file
spurred us at Privacy Activism 14 to try to analyze data aggregators' data
accuracy.15 It is very hard to get access to enough of that data. We actually
had to wait for a company that was going to be doing background checks
anyway. We constructed a form for the company to provide to each of its
applicants, asking the applicant whether the information on the data aggre-
gator's report in each field was correct-yes or no-and asking the appli-
cant to consent to participating in our study anonymously. We did not
personally know any of the people that were involved in the study. What
we found in our small study was that 100% of the people in the study found
errors in their files. 16 Some of these errors were insignificant, such as a
14. PrivacyActivism, http://www.privacyactivism.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
15. See Bob Sullivan, ChoicePoint Files Found Riddled with Errors, MSNBC, Mar. 8, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7118767/.
16. Id.
[Vol 84:3
REASONS WHY WE SHOULD AMEND THE CONSTITUTION
misspelling of a name. In other cases, however, the errors were fairly se-
rious, 17 serious enough that it is likely that a person applying for a job
might not be hired based on the information in their file. Eighty percent of
participants had errors in their basic biographical information (name, ad-
dresses, or gender). 18 Because our sample was small, our study was not
statistically valid. However, it was interesting that even in such a small
sample, there were that many errors.
People have little control over their aggregated data. Rights to amend
these files are limited, and as a result of this incorrect information, people
cannot get jobs or may lose them. A friend of mine recently told me how he
suspects he lost a job. The job had been offered to him, pending a back-
ground check. After the prospective employer performed the background
check, the company withdrew the offer. Upon investigation, my friend
realized that there was an error in his file-a religious affiliation that was
incorrect. My friend believes that it was due to this error that his offer was
withdrawn.
D. Broader Impacts: TSA and Secure Flight
Errors in data aggregators' files also impact ability to get credit or
homeowners insurance. Now, these errors are impacting our ability to tra-
vel. One application using all of this incorrect data from data aggregators is
Secure Flight, 19 which is the government's latest incarnation of the CAPPS
(computer assisted passenger pre-screening) program.20 The goal of these
programs is to make it less likely that terrorists are able to board planes,
which is a good thing. However, the problem is that serious issues exist as
to whether these systems are structured correctly. Are they going to cor-
rectly identify passengers? What information is going to be used to identify
these "dangerous" passengers? How long are they going to store informa-
tion? In contrast with past programs, Secure Flight's description explicitly
includes the use of commercial data from private data aggregators. 21
Interestingly, the TSA put together a working group consisting of pri-
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See sources cited supra note 5.
20. For a discussion of CAPPS, see, for example, Deborah von Rochow-Leuschner, Capps 11 and
the Fourth Amendment: Does It Fly?, 69 J. AIR L. & CoM. 139 (2004); Michael J. DeGrave, Note,
Airline Passenger Profiling and the Fourth Amendment: Will Capps H1 Be Cleared for Takeoff?, 10
B.U. J. Sc1. & TECH. L. 125 (2004); Leigh A. Kite, Note, Red Flagging Civil Liberties and Due Process
Rights of Airline Passengers: Will a Redesigned Capps H System Meet the Constitutional Challenge?,
61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1385 (2004).
21. See sources cited supra note 5.
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vacy experts to examine the privacy and security issues associated with the
Secure Flight program. After nine months, based on the limited data infor-
mation they had received, including no plan describing the architecture or
any of the operating policies of Secure Flight, the working group concluded
that there was little they could say about the privacy or security of that
program.22
The big unanswered question about Secure Flight is how it might use
commercial data sources. But given what we know about the accuracy of
the data, and given the lack of any good policies by the Secure Flight
people, it seems like it is a recipe for a system that will further erode priva-
cy, compromise security, and probably not make us much safer. In fact, it
would probably make us less safe.
II. HOPE FOR THE FUTURE
I still have hope for the future, however. One of the places where I see
potential for building a coalition for change is with social networks. On the
grass roots level, people want to discuss privacy. They want to learn and
discuss the principles, and I find that encouraging.
A. Social Network Activism
I started to use social networks to try to start a grass roots privacy ef-
fort. I decided that I wanted to see if I could find people to engage in priva-
cy debates. I decided to explore the various social networks available.
There are many-including Facebook,23 MySpace, 24 LiveJournal, 25 and
22. SECURE FLIGHT WORKING GRP., REPORT OF THE SECURE FLIGHT WORKING GROUP (2005).
23. For a discussion of social networking generally, and Facebook specifically, see Carly Bran-
denburg, The Newest Way to Screen Job Applicants: A Social Networker's Nightmare, 60 FED. COMM.
L.J. 597 (2008); lan Bymside, Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using
Social Networking Sites to Research Applicants, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 445 (2008); Matt Maher,
You've Got Messages: Modern Technology Recruiting Through Text-Messaging and the Intrusiveness
of Facebook, 8 TEX. REv. ENT. & SPORTS L. 125 (2007); Kara D. Williams, Public Schools vs. MyS-
pace & Facebook: The Newest Challenge to Student Speech Rights, 76 U. CIN. L. REv. 707 (2008); Guy
Pessach, /Networked] Memory Institutions: Social Remembering, Privatization and its Discontents, 26
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71 (2008); Patricia Sinchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless
World, 21 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2007).
24. Patricia SAnchez Abril, A (My)space of One's Own: On Privacy and Online Social Networks,
6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73 (2007); Donald Carrington Davis, Note, Myspace Isn't Your Space:
Expanding the Fair Credit Reporting Act to Ensure Accountability and Fairness in Employer Searches
of Online Social Networking Services, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 237 (2007); Matthew J. Hodge,
Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy issues on the "New" Internet: Facebook.com and
Myspace.com, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 95 (2006); Elizabeth P. Stedman, Comment, MySpace, But Whose
Responsibility? Liability of Social-Networking Websites When Offline Sexual Assault of Minors Follows
Online Interaction, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 363 (2007).
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Tribe. 26 I chose Tribe as my initial social network. I joined and had to look
the other way with regard to Tribe's privacy policy 2 7 because privacy is not
exactly a company priority. Although you can decide how much personal
information you want to put onto your Tribe profile, you are pushed to add
more. For example, if you want to participate in any of the discussions, at
the very least you need to include a photo. You need to post some of your
interests. I included where I went to school and a very limited number of
my interests. You can also see all of your "friends" and their interests; by
friends, I mean those "trusted" people that you have met or connected with
on the social network of your choice.
I post frequently in the privacy and civil liberties communities. Any-
one who wanted to could find my particular communities, see what I post-
ed, and get a pretty good idea of where my politics lie. I performed that
little risk assessment, then I got online, created my profile, and started par-
ticipating. 28 I am not trying to disguise myself I want people to know who
I am. I want to inform people. I view social networks as mostly untapped
for political and private activism. 29 I started targeting people with whom I
built a little relationship and said, "Hey, you know, we should all get to-
gether off-line, and we should discuss these issues." I modeled these priva-
cy salons after the nineteenth-century French salons, where people would
get together in someone's drawing room and discuss the issues of the day.
We have done a few of these now. People tend to be very articulate. They
care about the issues related to privacy. But they do not always know what
to do, so through these discussions, they learn. At least they feel empo-
wered to voice their opinions publicly. For example, one information secu-
rity person who attended a salon never felt strong enough to post any of his
writings online. Now, after going to a privacy salon, he is posting regularly.
B. Scalability and Anonymity
One of the issues I still have not figured out is how to make the salon
idea scalable. Another issue is the idea of a social network that has privacy
25. LiveJournal, http://www.livejournal.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2009).
26. Tribe, http://www.tribe.com (last visited Dec. 16, 2009).
27. Tribe, Tribe Privacy Policy, http://sanfrancisco.tribe.net/template/pub,Pop.vm?content=
Privacy (last visited Dec. 16, 2009).
28. 1 confided this to some of my privacy advocate colleagues, and they were appalled; one of
them actually said to me, "Deborah you are so brave." I thought that was entertaining.
29. For example, extensive political organization for the Obama presidential campaign occurred
on Facebook, particularly on an issue-based basis. See, e.g., Senator Obama-Please, No Telecom
Immunity and Get FISA Right, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=17961184023
(last visited Dec. 16, 2009).
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as a core value and does not aggressively track its users. A group of people
I met on a social network and I decided to create an alternative social net-
work in which privacy is respected. It is called freeassocation.net, and it is
in its infancy.30 These two spaces, the privacy salons and freeassocia-
tion.net, are the places where I started talking about my idea for a proposed
amendment to the Constitution to protect privacy. 31 It was also these spaces
that reminded me of the challenges of scaling out any effective privacy
effort and the importance of a rights-based approach.
III. A PRIVACY AMENDMENT
In the United States, we tend to discuss the problem of the nation lack-
ing strong laws to protect privacy, but we have never really had a national
discussion about it. Additionally, current national legislation tends to be
reactive and does not always take into account new technologies. 32 Putting
everything under the privacy umbrella also creates confusion because pri-
vacy is very abstract. It is nebulous, and we may all want to protect differ-
ent aspects of it. What we are trying to protect is not just this nebulous idea
of privacy; it is various things that have a privacy facet to them. For exam-
ple, privacy issues include each of the following issues relating to personal
security and dignity.
A. Safety and Security Interests
Pervasive identity checks are creating a check-point society. There is a
30. Free Association, http://free-association.net/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2009).
31. The reception in those spaces was positive to my proposed amendment.
32. For example, the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) is one such statute. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2006). See also Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312
(2009). For a discussion of COPPA, see Gaia Bernstein, When New Technologies Are Still New: Win-
dows of Opportunity for Privacy Protection, 51 VILL. L. REV. 921 (2005); Andrea M. Matwyshyn,
Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Information Security and Securities Regulation, 3
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 129 (2005); Edward L. Palmer & Lisa Sofio, Food and Beverage Marketing to
Children in School, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 33 (2006). Commentators have observed that COPPA was a
reaction to the failure of self-regulation, particularly subsequent to the Kids.com advisory letter where
the FTC set forth standards for privacy policies on websites targeting children. For a discussion of the
Kids.com FTC letter, see Parry Aftab, How COPPA Came About, INFORMATIONWEEK, Jan 19, 2004,
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=17300888. Additionally promul-
gated regulations state that the appropriate security measures for protecting children's data include
"using secure web servers and firewalls; deleting personal information once it is no longer being used;
limiting employee access to data and providing those employees with data-handling training; and
carefully screening the third parties to whom such information is disclosed." Children's Online Privacy
Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59906 (Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 312.8). This tech-
nology specification fails. For example, the implementing regulations instruct companies to use "secure
servers;" servers cannot be inherently "secure" or "vulnerable." Securing a server is a process that is
ongoing.
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lack of due process with creating and enforcing the TSA's No-Fly list, 33
and we experience overly intrusive searches at the airport. 34 RFID tags35
that are embedded into identification documents like passports or possibly
driver's licenses may expose us to unnecessary risks to our safety.36
B. Dignity Interest
In addition to trying to protect our own individual security, we want to
protect our dignity interests that relate to core liberty interests in our socie-
ty. When we post online, particularly if we are posting dissenting views, we
really want to protect our anonymity. 37 A privacy threat that looms con-
stantly is that of limiting reproductive rights38 and the ability to act auto-
nomously with respect to our bodies. Finally, personally identifiable
information collected by third parties may impact our ability to act in self-
deterministic ways, particularly if this collection results in identity theft.39
33. For a discussion of the TSA No-Fly list, see Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The
Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2008); Sharon Bradford Franklin &
Sarah Holcomb, Watching the Watch Lists: Maintaining Security and Liberty in America, 34 HUM.
RTS., Summer 2007, at 18; Ravich, supra note 5; Shane, supra note 5; Daniel J. Steinbock, Designating
the Dangerous: From Blacklists to Watch Lists, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 65 (2006); Christopher Slobo-
gin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (2008).
34. Anita Ramasastry, Lost in Translation? Data Mining, National Security and the "Adverse
Inference" Problem, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 757 (2006); Justin Florence,
Note, Making the No Fly List Fly: A Due Process Model for Terrorist Watchlists, 115 YALE L.J. 2148,
2152 (2006).
35. Gal Eschet, FIPs and PETs for RFID: Protecting Privacy in the Web of Radio Frequency
Identification, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 301 (2005); Nicole A. Ozer, Rights "Chipped" Away: RFID and
Identification Documents, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1; Lars S. Smith, RFID and Other Embedded
Technologies: Who Owns the Data?, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 695 (2006).
36. Kim Zetter, Hackers Clone E-Passports, WIRED, Aug. 3, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/science/discoverieslnews/2006/08/71521.
37. For a discussion of internet anonymity, see, for example, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F.
Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537 (2007); David
L. Sobel, The Process that "John Doe " Is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge to Internet Anonymity,
5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3 (2000); Kevin Wein, Recent Development, Dendrite v. Doe: A New Standard for
Protecting Anonymity on Internet Message Boards, 42 JURIMETRICS 465 (2002).
38. For a discussion of reproductive rights, see, for example, Diana D.M. Babor, Population
Growth and Reproductive Rights in International Human Rights Law, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 83 (1999);
Dina Bogecho, Putting It to Good Use: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
Women's Right to Reproductive Health, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 229 (2004); Pamela
Bridgewater, Gonzales v. Carhart: Continuing the Class Critique of the Reproductive Rights Doctrine
and Movement, 59 S.C. L. REV. 827 (2008); David B. Cruz, Heterosexual Reproductive Imperatives, 56
EMORY L.J. 1157 (2007); Cynthia Dailard, What Lawrence v. Texas Says About the History and Future
of Reproductive Rights, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 717 (2004).
39. Samantha Grant, "I Just Bought a Flat Screen T V. in Kolkata?" Application of Laws for
International Outsourcing Related Identity Theft, 7 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y (2006); Chris Jay
Hoofnagle, Identity Theft: Making the Known Unknowns Known, 21 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 97 (2007);
Kamaal Zaidi, Identity Theft and Consumer Protection: Finding Sensible Approaches to Safeguard
Personal Data in the United States and Canada, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 99 (2007).
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C. Possible Language for an Amendment
Privacy is a fundamental human right. It is certainly a necessary com-
ponent of our notion of liberty-a right that we should be able to assert
against governments as well as organizations. As such, I argue we need an
amendment to the Constitution which states the following: "All people are
by nature, free, independent, and have an inalienable right to privacy. Pri-
vacy encompasses anonymity, dignity, security, autonomy, and self deter-
mination. No one may impair the privacy rights of a living person."
